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A Prayer for Relief: Assessing the Constitutionality  
of Missouri’s Right to Pray Amendment 
 
Meredith Schlacter

 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 7, 2012, the state of Missouri passed by popular vote 
the Religious Freedom in Public Places amendment.
1
 Many have 
called the amendment the “Right to Pray” amendment,2 although its 
official title is “Religious Freedom in Public Places.”3 The summary 
that appeared on the ballot in August asserted the amendment would 
ensure Missourians’ right to express their religious beliefs and 
mandate all public schools display the Bill of Rights of the United 
States Constitution.
4
  
The full text of the amendment, however, is quite distinct from the 
more innocuous language that appeared on the ballot.
5
 The 
amendment actually provides that government officials may “pray 
individually or corporately in a private or public setting,” including 
on government property.
6
 It also allows students to express their 
religious beliefs in school assignments, and it gives students leave to 
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 1. Chris Good, Missouri Passes Right-to-Pray Amendment, Re-stating Freedoms, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/missouri-passes-
right-to-pray-amendment-re-stating-freedoms/. The amendment passed with 83 percent of the 
vote in the Missouri Primary election on August 7, 2012. Id. 
 2. Id.  
 3. H.R.J. Res. 2, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
 4. 2012 Ballot Measures, MO. SEC’Y OF ST., http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2012 
ballot/. 
 5. Compare MO. CONST. art. I, § 5, with 2012 Ballot Measures, supra note 4.  
 6. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
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refuse to participate in school assignments that violate their religious 
beliefs.
7
  
The discrepancy between the ballot language and the substance of 
the amendment immediately sparked litigation.
8
 In Coburn v. Mayer, 
the plaintiffs, backed by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
challenged the summary statement of the amendment on the ballot as 
insufficient and unfair.
9
 They asserted the summary statement 
“deceive[d] and misle[d] voters about the purpose and effects of the 
proposed amendment.”10 The trial court found the statement 
“sufficient and fair,” and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.
11
 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, and the summary statement remained on the ballot as 
originally written.
12
  
Part I of this Note reviews the history of the Religious Freedom in 
Public Places amendment, including the legislative history of the 
amendment and the controversy that has met its passage. Part I also 
examines relevant constitutional provisions and prior court decisions 
addressing religion and the government. Part II analyzes Missouri’s 
Religious Freedom in Public Places amendment and considers whom 
it protects and whom it is likely to hurt. Part III argues the 
amendment is unconstitutional, and Part IV considers the legal 
responses available for challenging it, including legislative and 
litigation-based strategies. This Note proposes that the amendment 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. Coburn v. Mayer, 368 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 323. “Plaintiffs argue that the Missouri Constitution already provides for the 
right to express religious beliefs without infringement and, therefore, the summary statement 
misleads voters into thinking that such a right is a change that would be effected by the passage 
of the proposed amendment.” Id. at 324.  
 11. Id. at 323.  
 12. Id. at 322. The court held the word “ensure” in the text made clear that the purpose of 
the amendment was to safeguard and protect religious freedoms, even if those freedoms already 
existed in the former text of the Missouri constitution. Id. at 324. The court also held that the 
text of the amendment did not repeal prisoners’ rights to religious freedom, but merely made 
their rights consistent with federal law. Id. at 325. Finally, the court held that the language in 
the summary statement was broad enough to cover the provision of the amendment which gives 
students the right to refrain from participating in educational activities that they believe violate 
their religious beliefs, despite the fact that the summary statement did not actually mention this 
provision. Id. at 326.  
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should be invalidated in federal court under either the Establishment 
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
I. HISTORY  
Republican State Representative Mike McGhee was the lead 
sponsor of the Religious Freedom in Public Places amendment; for 
two years, he sponsored legislation that eventually led to the 
amendment’s passage in the 2011 Regular Legislative Session of the 
Missouri House of Representatives.
13
 McGhee and the amendment’s 
other supporters asserted the amendment was needed “to make the 
state constitution match the U.S. Constitution and protect 
Christianity,” which he argued was “under attack.”14  
McGhee cited two incidents to demonstrate the need for this 
amendment. One, in 2006, involved a Christian student at Missouri 
State University who was asked, as part of a class project, to write 
and sign a letter supporting adoption rights for gay couples.
15
 The 
second incident involved a teacher who reportedly stopped a 
kindergartener from singing “Jesus Loves Me” on the playground and 
suggested that he sing “Mommy Loves Me” instead.16  
The Conference Committee in the Missouri House apparently 
agreed with McGhee that these incidents called for an amendment to 
the Missouri Constitution. The summary of the committee version of 
the bill explained the bill was “important because of recent 
litigation.”17 It stated, “It is important to delineate our rights. There is 
 
 13. Tim Townsend, Missouri’s Proposed Amendment 2 on Prayer Gets Mixed Reviews, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISP., July 30, 2012, available at http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/faith-and-
values/missouri-s-proposed-amendment-on-prayer-gets-mixed-reviews/article_8b188463-9973-
532c-92d9-223235cad84a.html [hereinafter Townsend, Mixed Reviews]. 
 14. Missouri Votes to Fortify Public Prayer with Amendment that Critics Call 
Unnecessary, FOX NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/07/ 
missouri-votes-tuesday-on-amendment-to-fortify-public-prayer/ [hereinafter Missouri Votes to 
Fortify Public Prayer]. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Summary of the Committee Version of the Bill, Religious Freedom in Public Places, 
H.R.J. Res. 2, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011), available at http://house.mo.gov/ 
content.aspx?info=/bills111/bilsum/commit/sHJR2C.htm [hereinafter Summary of the Bill]. 
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more systemic and societal ignorance about the expression of religion 
today than ever before.”18  
There was much support for the amendment from Christian 
organizations in Missouri, including the Missouri Family Network,
19
 
which supports conservative Christian political goals.
20
 Some 
religious leaders also supported the amendment, including four 
Roman Catholic bishops.
21
 
A. The Amendment 
The text of the “Right to Pray” amendment begins with a 
declaration of religious freedom, including that the state cannot 
establish an official religion.
22
 It goes on to require that no one be 
prevented from participating in individual or corporate prayer, as 
long as the prayer does not result in a disturbance of the peace.
23
 This 
includes prayer on government property or in government meetings.
24
 
The amendment then turns to school students, and prohibits schools 
from requiring students to participate in assignments that they say 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. See also Dave Helling, Missouri Voters OK ‘Right to Pray’ Amendment, MIAMI 
HERALD, Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/08/2939291/missouri 
-voters-ok-right-to-pray.html. Kerry Messer, president of the Missouri Family Network, stated 
Missourians supported the amendment because “‘[t]he public feels like the Supreme Court took 
[religious liberty] away from them over 50 years ago’ with a ruling against mandatory school 
prayer.” Id. He referred to the 1962 Supreme Court decision Engel v. Vitale, in which the Court 
decided that mandatory school prayer was a violation of the United States Constitution. 370 
U.S. 421 (1962). But see Simon Brown, Missouri’s Deceptive Amendment 2 Passes: Will 
Lawsuits Follow?, AMS. UNITED (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/ 
missouri-s-deceptive-amendment-2-passes-will-lawsuits-follow (“In reality, Amendment 2 is not 
so benign. It opens the door for coercive prayer and proselytizing in public schools, allows 
students to skip homework if it offends their religious beliefs and infringes on the religious 
liberty rights of prisoners.”).  
 20. See Defending Traditional Families, MO. FAMILY NETWORK (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://missourifamilynetwork.net/. 
 21. Mo. Voters Decide on Religious-Freedom Amendment, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 3, 
2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/mo-voters-to-decide-on-religious-freedom-amend 
ment. In statements supporting the amendment, the bishops wrote, “People of faith need 
assurance that they remain free to exercise and express their religious beliefs in public, provided 
just order be observed, without threat of external pressure to conform to changing societal 
‘norms.’” Id.  
 22. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/15
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violate their religious beliefs.
25
 Students must also be able to express 
their religious beliefs in school in accordance with existing free 
speech rights.
26
 Finally, the amendment requires public schools 
display the Bill of Rights.
27
 
B. Criticism of the Amendment 
The amendment sparked controversy from the moment it was 
proposed, and disagreements over its implications did not end with its 
passage. Many civil rights groups opposed the amendment, including 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, NARAL 
Pro-Choice Missouri, Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State, and the Anti-Defamation League.
28
 Religious 
organizations, especially those from non-Christian faiths, such as the 
Jewish Community Relations Council and the Islamic Foundation of 
St. Louis, spoke out against the amendment.
29
 Notably, criticism was 
not limited to non-Christians, and Christian leader Bishop Wayne 
Smith of the Episcopal Archdiocese of Missouri also criticized the 
amendment.
30
 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. The official ballot title of the amendment specified that this means students “have 
the right to pray and acknowledge God voluntarily in their schools.” 2012 Ballot Measures, 
supra note 4. 
 27. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 28. Summary of the Bill, supra note 17 (“Testifying against the bill were the American 
Civil Liberties Union—Eastern Missouri; and NARAL Pro-Choice Missouri.”); see also 
Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13 (“Groups such as . . . Americans United for the 
Separation of Church and State have questioned [the bill]. . . . Leaders of non-Christian faith 
groups such as the Anti-Defamation League . . . recently began to organize under the name 
Missouri Coalition to Keep Politics Out of Religion.”). 
 29. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13 (“Les Sterman, domestic issues advocacy 
chair for the Jewish Community Relations Council, said the amendment ‘sanctioned religious 
activity in public places’ and would have ‘the net effect of sanctioning certain religions that 
tend to dominate in certain areas, and we find that alarming.’ Ghazala Hayat of the Islamic 
Foundation of St. Louis called the amendment ‘redundant’ and said that if it passed it would 
mean that ‘the majority faith is sending a message to Americans of minority faiths’ that ‘you’re 
not part of us.’”).  
 30. Id. (“[P]rayer in public schools ‘becomes the vehicle for a sectarian agenda, typically 
Christian and typically Protestant, in violation of the no-establishment clause of the U.S. 
Constitution’s First Amendment.’”). 
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Many of these opponents fear the Right to Pray amendment will 
violate religious freedoms of minorities.
31
 Opponents also assert the 
United States Constitution and the former text of the Missouri 
Constitution adequately protect religious freedoms, so this new 
amendment is redundant.
32
 Scholars and opponents have suggested 
the amendment will be challenged in federal courts, and believe the 
courts will strike it down because of its redundancy and the 
ambiguity in the text.
33
 Another problem critics cite is the possibility 
students may try to use the provision as permission to evangelize or 
proselytize to their fellow students or teachers.
34
  
One of the most controversial aspects of the Right to Pray 
amendment is a provision that allows students to refrain from 
participating in educational activities they contend violate their 
religious beliefs.
35
 Opponents worry students, citing this provision, 
will opt to refrain from taking classes or learning about subjects that 
are important to their future educational pursuits.
36
 Challengers also 
point out that students may refrain from participating in sex education 
classes or learning about contraceptives, which could have 
detrimental long-term effects.
37
  
 
 31. Brown, Missouri’s Deceptive Amendment 2 Passes, supra note 19. Simon Brown of 
Americans United, an organization dedicated to preserving the separation of church and state, 
wrote, “In reality, Amendment 2 is not so benign. It opens the door for coercive prayer and 
proselytizing in public schools, allows students to skip homework if it offends their religious 
beliefs and infringes on the religious liberty rights of prisoners.” Id.; Our Mission, AMS. 
UNITED, https://www.au.org/about/our-mission (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 32. Mo. Voters Decide on Religious-Freedom Amendment, supra note 21. Karen Aroesty, 
regional director of the Anti-Defamation League, stated, “The amendment is redundant. 
Missouri law and constitutional law already protect from the concerns that appear to be raised 
by the folks who support it. . . . The language is vague and ambiguous. It’s going to result in a 
fair amount of litigation.” Id.  
 33. Id.; Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. Charles Haynes of the First 
Amendment Center stated, “This is the beginning of what will be endless litigation going over 
the same ground we’ve been over before.” Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Missouri Votes to Fortify Public Prayer, supra note 14; see H.R.J. Res. 2, 96th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The resolution specifies, “[N]o student shall be compelled to 
perform or participate in academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or 
her religious beliefs.” Id.  
 36. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. Michael McKay of the nonprofit Skeptical 
Society of St. Louis stated, “[I]f the amendment passes, students could graduate from school 
without having taken an important science class, avoid learning about evolution.” Id.  
 37. Id. “[B]ecause the Catholic church teaches that contraception is immoral, a Catholic 
student in public school might opt out of a class ‘to avoid putting condoms on bananas.’” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  A Prayer for Relief 299 
 
 
C. Prior Cases and Scholarship about Religion and Education 
Federal questions relating to freedom of religious expression are 
governed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
38
 
and are interpreted by the Supreme Court within its power to hear 
cases arising under the Constitution.
39
 The Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have encountered the tension between church and state 
on numerous occasions.
40
  
The Supreme Court has established standards for determining 
whether a state practice violates the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The controlling case 
dealing with the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman,
41
 in 
which the Court laid out a test regarding the Establishment Clause. 
To be a valid statute, “First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”42 
Although this test has been debated by the Supreme Court, it remains 
the primary means for finding an Establishment Clause violation.
43
  
 
 38. The First Amendment begins, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. This 
is understood as containing two clauses: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause. See generally Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1709 (2000). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.  
 40. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding a state practice using 
tax-raised funds to pay for buses for parochial school students did not violate the First 
Amendment where the practice was part of a general program that paid the fares of students 
attending public and other schools); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding a 
violation of the First Amendment where the state’s public school buildings were used for 
religious teaching during the school day); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding a 
state law prohibiting evolution from being taught in public schools violated the First 
Amendment); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding a state statute imposing certain 
requirements only on religious organizations that solicit more than 50 percent of their funds 
from nonmembers discriminates against those organizations in violation of the First 
Amendment); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (upholding a preliminary 
injunction requiring the removal of a display of the Ten Commandments at courthouses, where 
the display’s purpose was to celebrate the religious message in the Ten Commandments, in 
violation of the First Amendment). 
 41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 42. Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted). 
 43. See Choper, supra note 38, at 1737–38. 
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In recent years, the Court has also implicitly—although not 
formally—accepted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, laid out in 
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.
44
 That test clarified the Lemon 
test for determining whether a government practice serves to endorse 
religion.
45
 O’Connor explained: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of 
government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact 
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An 
affirmative answer to either question should render the 
challenged practice invalid.
46
  
One of the most important cases dealing with the Free Exercise 
Clause is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.
47
 In 
that case, a Santeria church was in the process of opening when the 
city counsel of Hialeah enacted a series of ordinances prohibiting 
ritual animal slaughtering, a Santeria practice.
48
 While the text of the 
laws at issue was not explicitly discriminatory, the Court found the 
laws neither neutral nor generally applicable; they “had as their 
object the suppression of religion.”49 The Court explained, “The 
principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in 
a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by 
religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed 
by the Free Exercise Clause.”50 To determine whether the state laws 
violated the First Amendment, the Court applied strict scrutiny.
51
 The 
Court stated, “The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself 
to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals 
for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its 
 
 44. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Choper, supra note 38, at 1723. 
 45. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 48. Id. at 526. 
 49. Id. at 542. 
 50. Id. at 543. 
 51. Id. at 546. 
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practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to 
the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”52  
One example of a practice the Supreme Court has declared 
unacceptable under the First Amendment is the kind of prayer in 
government meetings that tends to favor one religion explicitly.
53
 Not 
long ago, the Court stated that “[m]anifesting a purpose to favor one 
faith over another, or adherence to religion generally, clashes with the 
understanding . . . that liberty and social stability demand a religious 
tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens.”54 That 
sentiment was expressed decades earlier in Larson v. Valente,
55
 
where the Supreme Court reiterated, “[N]o State can ‘pass laws 
which aid one religion’ or that ‘prefer one religion over another.’”56  
Another issue that the courts have historically struggled with is 
the question of whether students may opt out of educational activities 
they claim violate their religious beliefs.
57
 In 1987, the Sixth Circuit 
in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education decided whether a 
school district could require students to use textbooks containing 
information offensive to their religious beliefs.
58
 The court held the 
school district’s requirement that the children use the books did not 
violate the right to freedom of religion, because there was no 
compulsion by the school district to either do an act or affirm or 
 
 52. Id. at 547. 
 53. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 844. 
 54. Id. at 860 (citation omitted).  
 55. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1982)). 
 56. Id. The Court went on to state, “The government must be neutral when it comes to 
competition between sects.” Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). Thus, 
when the Court is “presented with a state law granting a denominational preference,” it must 
apply strict scrutiny to decide whether it is constitutional. Id.  
 57. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing that “education 
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society,” but holding 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state from forcing Amish parents to send 
their children to school until age sixteen, where the parents claimed the state requirement 
violated their religious beliefs). 
 58. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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disavow a belief that violated the students’ religion.59 The court noted 
the parents had the option to send their children to private, religious 
schools or to teach them at home, if they did not approve of the 
public school curriculum.
60
 
Two years earlier, the Ninth Circuit decided Grove v. Mead 
School District, in which a parent sued a school district to force 
officials to ban a book her daughter’s class was reading, claiming it 
violated her religious beliefs.
61
 The court struggled with the tension 
between a parent’s right to control her child’s education and the 
school’s right to teach students according to its curriculum.62 
Importantly, the court recognized that “one aspect of the religious 
freedom of parents is the right to control the religious upbringing and 
training of their minor children.”63 Ultimately, however, the court 
held the school board’s actions did not constitute a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.
64
 
Rosemary Salomone, in her article “Common Schools, 
Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent,” recognizes 
the clash between a parent’s interests and a school’s interests.65 She 
 
 59. Id. at 1065-66. Exposure to other students performing acts that were contrary to the 
plaintiffs’ religious beliefs was not sufficient to constitute compulsion. Id. at 1066. The court 
borrowed reasoning from the Ninth Circuit: 
The lesson is clear: governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious 
beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise. An actual burden on the profession 
or exercise of religion is required.  
In short, distinctions must be drawn between those governmental actions that actually 
interfere with the exercise of religion, and those that merely require or result in 
exposure to attitudes and outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion.  
Id. at 1068 (quoting Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1543 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 60. Id. at 1067. 
 61. 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985). In Grove, a student and her mother determined a 
book she was reading in class violated their religious beliefs. Id. The school allowed the student 
to leave class while the book was being discussed, but the student remained in the classroom. 
Id. Her mother then attempted to have the school ban the book altogether, and brought suit 
against the school district. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 1534. 
 65. See Rosemary Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the 
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 169–73 (1996). Salomone writes, “While 
courts have been less receptive to non-religion-based claims, arguments supporting both have 
drawn in part from the individual’s freedom of conscience as the central liberty unifying the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/15
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characterizes it as a tension between individual rights to freedom of 
conscience and belief, including a parent’s right to control her child’s 
education, and the authority of school officials to make decisions 
regarding the school curriculum.
66
 This tension is present in Mozart 
as well as in the Right to Pray amendment. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT 
Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mozert, the Missouri Right 
to Pray amendment allows parents and students to ignore part of a 
school’s curriculum if it conflicts with their religious beliefs.67 This 
could have two possible results. First, the amendment could help 
clarify the law where courts have not consistently explained how to 
allay the tension between a student’s or parent’s interests and a 
school’s interests.68 If students can opt out of some assignments 
under the amendment, the need for litigation might be reduced. 
Contrarily, the ambiguity of the amendment’s text, and the 
uncertainty as to its application, might instead create more confusion 
and lead to increased litigation.
69
 
 
First Amendment clauses and in part from parental rights stemming from the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.” Id. at 171 (internal citation omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Compare Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065 (holding the requirement that public school 
students study a reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create an 
unconstitutional burden) with MO. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating “no student shall be compelled to 
perform or participate in academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or 
her religious beliefs”). 
 68. See Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. According to John Yeats, executive 
director of the Missouri Baptist Convention, “The courts have muddied the water. . . . Therefore 
the state Legislature believed that a state Constitutional amendment was the best way to clear 
things up.” Id.  
 69. Id. (quoting The First Amendment Center’s Charles Haynes as saying “[the 
amendment] takes away ambiguity on one hand, but opens up practices that have already been 
struck down as unconstitutional on the other.”); see also Stephen Steigman & Brian Ellison, 
Missouri Amendment 2: ‘Right to Pray’ Or Redundant Rights?, KAN. CITY PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 
5, 2012, 9:48 PM), http://kcur.org/post/missouri-amendment-2-right-pray-or-redundant-rights 
(“[O]pponents argue that the measure would do more harm than good for public schools 
because the measure does not specify what can constitute a ‘religious belief.’”); Joseph L. 
Conn, Rush to Judgment: Missouri’s Deceptive ‘Right to Pray’ Amendment Heads for August 
Ballot, AMS. UNITED (May 25, 2012), https://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/rush-to-
judgment-missouri-s-deceptive-right-to-pray-amendment-heads-for (“[T]he wording is so open-
ended that it’s certain to result in problems in the classroom.”). If opponents are correct that 
schools will now be required to make value judgments as to whose religious beliefs should 
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A. Whom Will it Protect? 
Sponsors and supporters of the amendment have made it clear its 
purpose is to protect Christianity and Christians from what they 
believe is an increasingly hostile world.
70
 According to the Roman 
Catholic bishops that supported the measure, “Increasingly, it seems, 
religious values are becoming marginalized in society . . . . People of 
faith need assurance that they remain free to exercise and express 
their religious beliefs in public, provided just order be observed, 
without threat of external pressure to conform to changing societal 
‘norms.’”71 The Reverend Terry Hodges, the pastor of Representative 
McGhee, who sponsored the bill, said the amendment will “level the 
playing field.”72 He stated, “For the first 150 years in this country 
Christianity enjoyed home-field advantage . . . . That’s changed now 
and there’s a hostility toward Christians.”73  
Supporters of the amendment cite several benefits the amendment 
will have in serving Christians’ interests. For example, John Yeats, 
executive director of the Missouri Baptist Convention, believes the 
amendment will help clarify Missourian’s religious freedom rights.74 
Better information, in turn, will enable Christians to more effectively 
exercise these rights.
75
 Additionally, supporters say, the amendment 
will protect those government officials who wish to begin meetings 
with sectarian prayers.
76
  
 
allow them to refrain from certain activities, the issue will inevitably become more confused. 
Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 70. ‘Right to Pray’ Amendment Passes, CBS NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012, 9:19 PM), http:// 
stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/08/07/right-to-pray-amendment-passes/ [hereinafter Amendment 
Passes]. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 73. Id. Despite Rev. Hodges’ belief that Christians in Missouri are losing their influence, 
about 80 percent of Missourians currently identify as Christian. U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, http://religions.pewforum.org/maps (last 
visited June 28, 2014). 
 74. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13.  
 75. Id. (“The measure’s champions say it better defines Missourians’ First Amendment 
rights and will help to protect the state’s Christians, about 80 percent of the population, who 
they say are under siege in the public square.”). 
 76. Tim Townsend, Missouri to Vote on Prayer Amendment 2 Known as ‘Right to Pray’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2012, 8:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/04/ 
missouri-prayer-amendment-vote_n_1739968.html [hereinafter Townsend, Missouri to Vote]. 
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Many supporters of the amendment also believe it will protect 
students who wish to refrain from learning certain subjects in school 
or from participating in activities they believe violate their religious 
beliefs.
77
 And one of the most notorious subjects students will be able 
to avoid is evolution.
78
  
But evolution will not be the only subject affected. Students will 
also be able to avoid learning about other world religions, if they 
believe doing so violates their own religious beliefs.
79
 Representative 
McGhee cited this as one of his reasons for sponsoring the 
amendment.
80
 He said his intent was not necessarily to allow students 
to opt out of learning about evolution but to allow them to opt out of 
classes “on Buddha or on Islam, or for a Muslim kid to be able to say 
he won’t take a class on Christianity if he feels it contradicts his 
faith.”81  
 
 77. Editorial, Prayer in Missouri, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/opinion/prayer-in-missouri.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Prayer 
in Missouri].  
 78. Jason Hancock, Missouri ‘Right-to-Pray’ Amendment Spurs Debate, KAN. CITY STAR, 
Aug. 2, 2012, available at http://midwestdemocracy.com/articles/right-to-pray-amendment-
spurs-debate-about-students-opting-out-of-schoolwork/. Susan German, president of the 
Science Teachers of Missouri, wrote to members of the organization, “It is evident that some of 
the major areas of concern include teaching the age of the Earth, evolution, or climate change in 
the science classrooms.” Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. Although critics of the amendment have focused in large part on students’ 
newfound freedom to refrain from learning about evolution, their ability to opt out of learning 
about other religions could be even more harmful than the potential for students to skip biology 
class. As Justice Clark wrote:  
[I]t might well be said that one’s education is not complete without a study of 
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement 
of civilization. . . . Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or 
of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may 
not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.  
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). Thus, it is possible allowing 
students to opt out of the important (and constitutional) study of other world religions will put 
them at an educational disadvantage. In addition, at a time in the United States where ignorance 
and fear about religions such as Islam are prevalent, allowing students to remain ignorant about 
other religions could further stigmatize and endanger people who belong to those minority 
religious groups. See Muhammad Babur, Ignorance, Fear and Hatred Make a Deadly Cocktail, 
POST-BULLETIN, Aug. 17, 2012, available at http://www.postbulletin.com/opinion/ignorance-
fear-and-hatred-make-a-deadly-cocktail/article_a281f855-f335-517a-8cca-bf72cd0691d2.html.  
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Students can also refuse to take sex education classes, or to learn 
about subjects related to social issues, such as feminism and gay 
marriage, if they believe those subjects violate their religion.
82
 The 
text of the amendment does not limit students’ power to opt out of 
academic assignments or educational presentations; presumably, it is 
in the student’s discretion to decide whether a particular subject 
violates his or her beliefs, and no topic is off-limits to that 
determination.
83
  
The amendment will also allow students to refer to God and 
religion in classroom assignments or in presentations, and neither 
teachers nor administrators will be able to prevent students from 
doing so.
84
 This will benefit students who feel their religion is an 
essential part of the way they understand school assignments and 
want to freely include discussions of their beliefs in those 
assignments. 
B. Whom Will it Hurt? 
1. Religious Minorities and the Non-religious 
Opponents of the amendment are concerned it will only benefit 
Christians, the majority religious group in Missouri, and that it will 
hamper the religious freedom of religious minorities.
85
 Since the vast 
 
 82. See, e.g., Jonah Kaplan, Legal Experts Warn about Ramifications of Missouri’s 
Prayer Amendment, KSPR NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://articles.kspr.com/2012-08-07/prayer-
amendment_33087631.  
 83. See Ashley Portero, Missourians Pass ‘Right to Pray’ Amendment, Reiterating 
Religious Protections for All—Except Prison Inmates, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012), http:// 
www.ibtimes.com/missourians-pass-right-pray-amendment-reiterating-religious-protections-all-
except-prison-inmates. 
 84. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. The text of the ballot language stated the amendment gives 
students the “right to pray and acknowledge God voluntarily in their schools.” H.R.J. Res. 2, 
96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). See also Portero, supra note 83 (Representative 
McGhee says the amendment lets people know, “You want to pray? Go ahead, it’s OK.”); 
Kellie Kotraba, Missouri prayer amendment passes, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2012, available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-08-08/missouri-prayer-amendment/ 
56882182/1. 
 85. Ray Hartmann, Think Again: Missouri’s “Right to Pray” Amendment Threatens 
Religious Freedom, ST. LOUIS MAG., July 2012, available at http://www.stlmag.com/St-Louis-
Magazine/July-2012/Think-Again-Missouris-Right-to-Pray-Amendment-Threatens-Religious-
Freedom/. The author points out that schools and the government belong equally to people of 
all religious faiths and those with no religious faith at all. Id. Thus, “the best way for religious 
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majority of religious Missourians identify with Christianity, some 
fear that “[a]s religion dominates the town square, so will 
Christianity.”86 Ghazala Hayat of the Islamic Foundation of St. Louis 
said of the amendment, “[T]he majority faith is sending a message to 
Americans of minority faiths that ‘you’re not part of us.’”87 Indeed, 
the amendment provides for greater religious influence in schools and 
in government buildings and meetings.
88
  
Critics fear this fortified ability to pray in school and to express 
religious beliefs through class assignments and presentations will 
ostracize and offend students from minority religion backgrounds, 
such as Jewish, Muslim, or Hindu students.
89
 It is similarly offensive 
to students who identify as atheist or agnostic, and who do not want 
to be indoctrinated by others’ religious expression at school.90  
The danger of ostracizing members of minority religions, and the 
question of where the line must be drawn, extends to government 
officials who do not identify with the majority religion or any 
religion at all. The amendment allows elected officials to pray 
privately or corporately in public, and it specifically allows for prayer 
before government meetings.
91
 Such a blatant display of religious 
belief may cause government officials to take offense or feel 
ostracized if they are not part of the group initiating the religious 
actions.  
The amendment specifies that public prayer may not disturb the 
peace or a public meeting,
92
 but critics of the amendment question 
how a “disturbance” will be defined.93 For example, one of the big 
questions with regard to the amendment and minority religions is: 
“What if one person’s ‘right to pray’ intrudes on another’s right to 
 
freedom for all people to flourish is to keep it removed from the influence of the government.” 
Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 88. Hartmann, supra note 85. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Amendment Passes, supra note 70. 
 92. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 93. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
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abstain from prayer, or to pray according to the tenets of his or her 
own faith?”94  
This poses a huge potential problem in both the school and the 
government context.
95
 While the amendment “reaffirms legislative 
prayers for government bodies, it doesn’t make clear that if those 
prayers are regularly of one particular faith, the practice would likely 
be struck down as unconstitutional.”96 The resulting “mess,” as 
Charles Haynes of the First Amendment Center referred to it, will 
most likely play out in the courtroom.
97
 David Kimball, a political 
science professor at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, believes the 
amendment “will surely be challenged in federal court. . . . And the 
language seems to me so hackneyed that federal courts will strike this 
down pretty quickly.”98  
2. School Districts and Public Universities 
The amendment has the potential to hurt public school districts in 
Missouri and public state universities.
99
 According to the American 
Civil Liberties Union, “Providing all students a right to refrain from 
school assignments and presentations that violate their religious 
beliefs . . . will cause untold mischief in both public and parochial 
schools and will adversely affect the quality of education in 
Missouri.”100 Others say that it will “create confusion and wreak 
havoc in classrooms by giving students the right to refuse to read 
anything or do any assignments that they claim offends their religious 
views.”101  
Some opponents fear the provision of the amendment allowing 
students to opt out of assignments is open to abuse by students, who 
 
 94. Townsend, Missouri to Vote, supra note 76. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Janese Silvey, Professors Discuss Effect of Right to Pray Law, COLUMBIA DAILY 
TRIB., Sept. 29, 2012, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2012/sep/29/professors 
-discuss-affect-of-right-to-pray-law/. 
 100. Matthew Brown, Legal Wrangling Begins over Missouri’s Prayer Amendment, 
DESERET NEWS, Aug. 9, 2012, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865560407/ 
Legal-wrangling-begins-over-Missouris-prayer-amendment.html?pg=all. 
 101. Prayer in Missouri, supra note 77.  
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might use it as an excuse to skip school or assignments they do not 
wish to complete.
102
 Teachers, then, might be forced to determine 
whose excuses are valid and whose are not.
103
 Some schools, such as 
the University of Missouri System, have suggested this kind of value 
judgment about the sincerity of a student’s objection to an assignment 
may be necessary.
104
  
In the wake of the amendment’s passage, the University of 
Missouri sought guidance from its attorneys as to what the 
amendment would require from professors whose students objected 
to assignments.
105
 Deputy Provost Ken Dean does not believe 
students will be able to use the amendment to refrain from 
participating in biology lessons that deal with evolution, since 
schools do not ask students to believe in evolution, only to 
understand it.
106
 Gordon Christensen, a professor and the school’s 
interfaculty representative, claims students will not be able to cite the 
amendment as a way to escape final exams.
107
 Instead, he asserts, a 
“student must be able to demonstrate that the assignment is clearly 
something that he or she morally objects to because of religious 
beliefs.”108 The school has yet to decide how this determination will 
be made, however.
109
 
School districts and universities will suffer further if the 
amendment leads to increased litigation, as many opponents fear it 
will.
110
 Alex Luchenitser, associate legal director for Americans 
United for the Separation of Church and State, stated, “This is going 
to be a nightmare for school districts, which will end up getting sued 
by individuals on both sides of [the] church-state debate.”111 Many 
 
 102. See Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Silvey, supra note 99. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. (“Christensen told professors the General Counsel’s office might not be able to 
provide guidance [on how to make this determination] just yet . . . .”). 
 110. Tim Townsend, ‘Right to Pray’ Measure Passes by Wide Margin, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISP., Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/right-to-pray-
measure-passes-by-wide-margin/article_4b916011-c4cb-5f69-85c0-2fc8e3f6a36e.html 
[hereinafter Townsend, Measure Passes]. 
 111. Id.  
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opponents believe the amendment is redundant, and fails to increase 
the protections for religious freedom already included in the U.S. 
Constitution.
112
 Democratic State Representative Chris Kelly, who 
opposed the amendment, called it “a jobs bill for lawyers,” 
emphasizing the increased litigation and pressure on the courts many 
believe will result from the amendment.
113
  
The possibility for students to opt out of assignments and classes 
they believe violate their religious beliefs brings into focus the debate 
about who controls the curriculum in public schools: the school 
district or the students and parents who are part of the district.
114
 
Tony Rothert, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Eastern Missouri, projects litigation will be the ultimate result of 
this debate, since “[s]chools are used to controlling the curriculum 
and having a wide discretion” in doing so.115  
The amendment’s opt-out provision for students takes that control 
away from the schools and places it, to an extent, in the hands of 
parents who want to ensure their children do not have to learn about 
certain subjects.
116
 Representative McGhee’s solution to this problem 
is for school districts to bow to the will of the students and parents.
117
 
He suggests if a school’s curriculum clashes with the amendment, 
“why not just change the curriculum so that it will be pleasing to all 
the students?”118  
Joe Ortwerth, executive director of the Missouri Family Policy 
Council, disagrees with Representative McGhee’s recommendation 
that school districts should adapt curricula to remove potentially 
objectionable subjects.
119
 Because the courts have consistently held 
that school districts, not parents, control school curricula,
120
 Ortwerth 
 
 112. Townsend, Missouri to Vote, supra note 76. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See Prayer in Missouri, supra note 77. 
 115. Amendment Passes, supra note 70. 
 116. See Jason Rosenbaum, Prayer Measure: Protection, Political Ploy or Creator of 
Havoc?, ST. LOUIS BEACON (July 27, 2012, 7:01 AM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/ 
26223/constitutional_amendment_on_prayer (suggesting students will now be able to opt out of 
“important curriculum units.”).  
 117. Hancock, supra note 78. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Rosenbaum, supra note 116. 
 120. Id.  
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recognizes individual students will not be successful in challenges to 
curricula as a whole.
121
 Instead, he argues schools can reduce 
litigation and students can avoid potentially offensive subjects if 
schools provide objecting students with the option of completing 
alternative assignments.
122
  
3. Students 
Opponents of the amendment argue students are disadvantaged 
when they do not learn about subjects they may not agree with.
123
 
Rothert of the ACLU stated, “Even if you have a religious 
disagreement about something you learn in a school, you still learn it. 
You don’t have to accept it, you don’t have to change your religious 
beliefs, but it’s part of the education system. And that’s how you get 
adults who know how to reason.”124  
Teachers Carol Ross Bauman and Elizabeth Petersen agree 
students will suffer if they are allowed to opt out of important science 
coursework.
125
 Allowing students to complete alternative 
assignments, as proponents of the amendment suggest, will not solve 
this problem. Even if students’ grades do not suffer from the choice 
to opt out, their ability to reason and develop critical thinking skills 
will be hindered.
126
  
This concern was part of the basis for the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in Mozert.
127
 The court there noted the United States Supreme 
Court’s affirmation “that public schools serve the purpose of teaching 
fundamental values ‘essential to a democratic society.’ These values 
‘include tolerance of divergent political and religious views’ while 
taking into account ‘consideration of the sensibilities of others.’”128 
 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Julie Bierach, Missourians to Vote on Prayer Amendment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 
6, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/06/158185835/missourians-to-vote-on-prayer-
amendment. 
 126. See Rosenbaum, supra note 116. 
 127. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 128. Id. at 1068 (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). 
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision went on to explain that “in a pluralistic 
society we must ‘live and let live.’”129  
This is precisely the kind of understanding that might be lost on 
students who are able to opt out of studying any subject they or their 
parents find objectionable on religious grounds. Ultimately, rather 
than benefitting these students, the ability to opt out may cause 
students to suffer the greatest loss—the ability to think critically and 
successfully confront their own beliefs.
130
   
III. ARGUMENT 
The Right to Pray amendment, as written, poses serious risks to 
the religious minority, school districts, educators, and students. It 
benefits those who wish to pray sectarian prayers in schools or at 
government meetings, and students who wish to opt out of learning 
certain subjects in school. However, it arguably hurts those students 
too, by allowing them to refrain from developing critical thinking 
skills.
131
 
Representative McGhee and other supporters of the amendment 
claim the amendment is necessary to ensure Missouri Christians’ 
religious freedoms.
132
 That claim has very little truth to it; the 
amendment is, for the most part, redundant.
133
 For example, there has 
never been a prohibition on student prayer in schools, as long as their 
actions are not mandated by the schools and do not infringe on other 
students’ rights.134 Similarly, nonsectarian prayer is often a feature of 
government meetings and public events.
135
 On its face, the 
amendment merely reiterates some of those rights that have always 
existed.
136
 
The requirement that all public schools have a copy of the Bill of 
Rights on display seems merely a nod to the concept of religious 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. See Portero, supra note 83; see also Rosenbaum, supra note 116. 
 131. Portero, supra note 83.  
 132. Missouri Votes to Fortify Public Prayer, supra note 14. 
 133. Mo. Voters Decide on Religious-Freedom Amendment, supra note 21.  
 134. Brown, Missouri’s Deceptive Amendment 2 Passes, supra note 19. 
 135. At Public Meetings, Fights Over Prayer Drag On, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Nov. 27, 
2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/at-public-meetings-fights-over-prayer-drag-on. 
 136. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
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liberty in an amendment that in reality does little to further liberty.
137
 
The idea of reminding educators and students of their rights under the 
United States Constitution is a nice one, and it may not infringe on 
anyone’s rights to require it; but it does not increase religious 
freedom.  
Where the amendment can be read to create “rights” that did not 
already exist, it does so in a manner that is questionable at best, and is 
likely downright unconstitutional in a number of ways.
138
 If the 
amendment is construed to allow for sectarian prayers in government 
meetings, it could unconstitutionally interfere with other people’s 
religious freedoms.
139
 This would occur if the prayers tended to 
represent a particular religion over any others, which is inconsistent 
with the First Amendment.
140
 Religious tolerance may ultimately be 
decreased with increased sectarian prayers in government settings.  
Similarly, allowing students to express their religious beliefs in 
school assignments opens the door to possible unconstitutional 
behavior.
141
 While students are already allowed to express their 
religious beliefs to an extent, this amendment could allow for that 
practice to exceed what is permitted by the federal Constitution. It 
would be problematic, for example, for students to use the provision 
to justify proselytizing to other students or teachers. If the provision 
was used in such a way, one student’s religious expression might 
easily infringe on another student’s religious beliefs in a way not 
permitted by the United States Constitution.
142
 This is one of the 
many situations those who oppose the amendment envision as ripe 
for litigation.
143
 It remains for the courts to decide where, under this 
amendment, one student’s religious rights end and another’s begin.  
Allowing students to opt out of lessons and assignments they 
claim violate their religious beliefs contradicts the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Mozert, one of the most significant cases dealing with 
 
 137. See Hartmann, supra note 85; Portero, supra note 83. 
 138. Townsend, Measure Passes, supra note 110. 
 139. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 140.  See Townsend, Missouri to Vote, supra note 76. 
 141. Brown, Missouri’s Deceptive Amendment 2 Passes, supra note 19. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:293 
 
 
religion in schools.
144
 In her analysis of Mozert, Nomi Maya 
Stolzenberg notes the Sixth Circuit’s hesitation to accept the idea that 
exposing school children to competing ideas violates the right to 
freedom of religion.
145
 The plaintiffs’ assertion in Mozert was 
difficult for the court to accept, because the objecting students did not 
want to be completely removed from other students.
146
 They wanted 
to remain in the public school but to opt out of certain activities.
147
 
Thus, the court’s proposal that the students utilize their right to leave, 
and attend a private school or learn at home, did not address the 
complaint.
148
 Stolzenberg writes, “[P]ermitting parents to insulate 
their children from exposure to foreign ideas can be seen as a way of 
drawing a circle that ‘shut[s] [their children] out’ from the larger 
democratic society.”149 The courts have historically been reluctant to 
allow parents to insulate their children in such a way.
150
  
 
 144. See Mozert, 872 F.2d at 1068–69. See also Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13. 
 145. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 598 (1993) 
(“The Sixth Circuit again reversed, this time endorsing the trial court’s initial view that, by 
definition, ‘mere exposure’ to ideas could not violate the right to the free exercise of religion.”). 
 146. Id. at 590.  
The Mozert plaintiffs did not challenge all or even most of the public school program. 
Nor did they assert the desire to opt out of public schooling altogether. For whatever 
reason, the plaintiffs indicated that they wished to participate in the public education 
system but not on conditions that violated their religious rights.  
Ironically, it is this apparently moderate posture that makes the Mozert claim so 
difficult.  
Id.  
 147. Id. at 589 (“They sought only to have their children excused from the Holt reading 
program—a remedy that in theory would permit the rest of the students to continue 
participating in the program and would not require teachers to alter their general course of 
instruction.”); see also Mozert, 872 F.2d at 1061 (“The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants 
liable because ‘forcing the student-plaintiffs to read school books which teach or inculcate 
values in violation of their religious beliefs and convictions is a clear violation of their rights to 
the free exercise of religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.’”). 
 148. Stolzenberg, supra note 145, at 590–91 (“Because the plaintiffs did not represent 
themselves as insular outsiders seeking to inhabit a perfectly separated sphere, their right to exit 
the public school system completely did not respond to their complaint. Conversely, because 
they did not seek to reshape or convert the public sphere, the school authorities could not 
readily dismiss their claim as an interference with the right of other students to be free from 
religious impositions.”). 
 149. Id. at 585. 
 150. Id. at 584 (quoting Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1073) (Boggs, J., concurring) (“Hawkins 
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But the Right to Pray amendment’s allowance for students to opt 
out of assignments gives them the opportunity to insulate themselves 
from the larger public school community, just as the plaintiffs in 
Mozert wished to do. Students who choose not to learn the subject of 
evolution, for example, or sex education are still choosing to remain 
in the larger public school context, but are insulating themselves from 
the specific teachings of the larger society they deem offensive or 
contrary to their religious views. Ultimately, students themselves will 
suffer from opting out of assignments and thereby shutting 
themselves out from their peers and secular society as a whole.
151
 
In Mozert, the Sixth Circuit was not willing to allow students to 
maintain an insular status within the larger context of a public school, 
determining that “‘mere exposure’ to ideas could not violate the right 
to the free exercise of religion.”152 The court expressly chose not to 
allow students to opt out of using a particular reading series that 
parents claimed offended their religious beliefs,
153
 thereby refusing to 
allow the parents in Mozert to exercise their “exclusive right to 
control their children’s upbringing,” which was the “specific interest 
they asserted most strongly.”154 Instead, the court recognized the 
importance of well-rounded students who can think critically because 
they engage in a variety of subjects they do not necessarily agree 
with.
155
 The Missouri amendment ignores the importance of that 
 
County is not required by the Constitution to allow plaintiffs the latitude they seek to opt out 
selectively of the offending school program, but remain enrolled in the public school.”). 
 151. See Kevin Davis, Missouri Amendment 2 Gives Kids a Free Pass Out of Class, 
DIVIDED UNDER GOD (Aug. 6, 2012), http://dividedundergod.com/2012/08/06/missouri-
amendment-2-gives-kids-a-free-pass-out-of-class/. Davis asserts: 
The well-rounded student has the option to compare both of those opinions with the 
teachings of their faith, weighing differences of opinion between the academic 
viewpoint and that of their spiritual leaders. 
[T]hose public school students who have had their curriculum censored, isolated, and 
narrowed could be subject to additional manipulation by religious leaders, taking 
advantage of a narrow-minded world view, thanks to this amendment.  
Id. 
 152. Stolzenberg, supra note 145, at 598. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 609. 
 155. Mozert, 872 F.2d at 1068–69. 
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concept by permitting students to opt out of school assignments they 
claim violate their religious beliefs.  
The ambiguity in the amendment presents the question whether it 
is sustainable at all.
156
 Even the provisions that are not necessarily 
new, such as the allowance for prayer before government meetings, 
raise so many questions about how they will be construed and 
enforced that litigation seems inevitable.
157
 Certainly, litigation on the 
subject of religious freedom is not a new phenomenon. Federal 
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have heard many cases on 
various aspects of the intersection between religious life and 
government in our country’s history.158 But the Missouri amendment 
muddies the waters of prior jurisprudence on the subject and will 
likely serve to create more confusion than it does clarity.  
The possibility of increased litigation regarding the expression of 
religion in public schools is especially problematic. Increased 
litigation harms schools; as Supreme Court Justice Jackson noted in a 
1948 concurring opinion, “Nothing but educational confusion and a 
discrediting of the public school system can result from subjecting it 
to constant law suits.”159 Justice Fortas expressed a similar sentiment 
twenty years later when he said that “[j]udicial interposition in the 
operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems 
requiring care and restraint.”160 Litigation can also saddle school 
districts—and taxpayers—with high financial costs that harm the 
districts.
161
 It therefore seems quite unwise to create laws that will 
increase litigation involving public schools.
162
   
 
 156. Townsend, Mixed Reviews, supra note 13.  
 157. Hancock, supra note 78. Gregory Lipper, an attorney for Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, expressed the problem creatively: “In trying to solve a made-up 
problem, this amendment generates a flood of legalese. . . . It adds more fine print to the 
Missouri constitution than you’d find in the typical apartment lease.” Id.  
 158. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 159. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 160. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
 161. See Brown, Missouri’s Deceptive Amendment 2 Passes, supra note 19. 
 162. Some litigation against public schools will probably always be inevitable, especially 
when dealing with such personal and controversial issues of religious freedom and expression. 
But legislators should be wary of introducing bills that do little more than subject public 
schools—and taxpayers—to increased litigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  A Prayer for Relief 317 
 
 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Right to Pray amendment is highly problematic from a 
constitutional and policy perspective. Because it will likely infringe 
on the religious freedoms of religious minorities, and because it is 
bound to lead to increased and destructive litigation within school 
districts, it should be struck down as unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.  
There are three ways the amendment may be struck down. The 
first possibility, suggested by Representative McGhee, is for the 
legislature to alter or repeal the amendment altogether.
163
 However, 
since it is an amendment to the state constitution, any changes will 
have to be approved by the House and the Senate, and then placed 
back on the ballot for popular vote.
164
 But Missouri voters are not 
likely to vote to repeal or significantly change a constitutional 
amendment that purports to broaden their religious freedom; this is 
especially true, since the majority of Missourians are Christians and 
fall into the category of people the amendment targets as 
beneficiaries. Additionally, leaving the fate of the amendment to 
voters is risky. Falling back on the possibility of revising the 
amendment is irresponsible when its drafters could have more 
carefully constructed it from the outset.  
The second option for striking down the amendment is to 
challenge it in federal court
165
 as violating the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment.
166
 This approach is the most likely to be 
successful. When the courts tackle the question of the Missouri 
amendment’s constitutionality, they will be able to decide whether to 
strike out portions deemed unconstitutional or whether to nullify the 
 
“[j]udicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises 
problems requiring care and restraint.” Mozert, 872 F.2d at 1069–70. 
 163. Hancock, supra note 78.  
 164. Id.  
 165. The amendment cannot be challenged in Missouri state court because a Missouri court 
would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the question of whether the amendment is 
constitutional under federal law. MO. CONST. art. V, § 3. To determine whether the amendment 
is constitutional under the United States Constitution, it must be challenged in a federal court, 
which has the power to decide questions that arise under the federal Constitution. U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2.  
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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entire amendment. If the Right to Pray amendment is challenged in 
federal court, it will most likely to be struck down under the 
Establishment Clause.  
The Court utilizes the three-part test laid out in Lemon to 
determine whether a state law violates the Establishment Clause.
167
 
Under that test, the Right to Pray amendment might be found to fail 
all three prongs. First, the amendment does not have a secular 
purpose.
168
 The amendment’s stated purpose is to advance religious 
freedom and expression; this is an inherently religious purpose, not a 
secular one.
169
  
 
 167. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court 
recognized the inherent difficulty in interpreting unclear language in the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. Id. at 612.  
Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state 
religion, an area history shows they regarded as very important and fraught with great 
dangers. Instead they commanded that there should be ‘no law respecting an 
establishment of religion’ . . . A law ‘respecting’ the proscribed result, that is, the 
establishment of religion, is not always easily identifiable as one violative of the 
Clause. A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one 
‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment 
and hence offend the First Amendment.  
Id. 
 168. See id. (“[T]he statute must have a secular legislative purpose.”). 
 169. Conversely, it could be argued that since the amendment on its face is designed to 
advance religious freedom without giving preference to any particular religion or even religious 
belief over unbelief, it does have a secular purpose. However, this argument is weak, since 
support for religion—even generally—is not advancing a secular purpose. It could also be 
argued that despite failing this prong of the Establishment Clause analysis, the government can 
support religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause. Choper, in his analysis of the Court’s 
First Amendment Clause jurisprudence, explained: 
Although the Court’s Establishment Clause opinions preached the virtues of a 
‘wholesome’ government neutrality towards religion, its Free Exercise rulings showed 
that in some circumstances neutrality is not constitutionally mandated. In fact, those 
cases sometimes held that the First Amendment requires government to act with a 
nonsecular purpose in order to permit the unburdened exercise of religion.  
Choper, supra note 38, at 1720. One could argue the amendment serves to promote the exercise 
of religion and is thus valid under the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has not 
reconciled the clash that can occur between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause. Id. at 1716. Even if the amendment might have some validity under the Free Exercise 
Clause, it likely will be found to violate the Establishment Clause and is thus unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment.  
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Second, the amendment’s primary effect is to advance religion.170 
Indeed, its stated purpose is to advance religion, and it does so in a 
number of ways. The amendment gives students permission to opt 
out of assignments for religious reasons, permitting under state 
authority that which the Sixth Circuit refused to allow individuals to 
do in Mozert. By permitting this behavior on the basis of state 
authority, the government is expressing a preference for religion over 
non-religion, which is forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
171
  
Third, the amendment results in an excessive entanglement 
between the government and religion, because it acts to promote and 
further religion.
172
 By allowing for increased religious expression in 
public schools and in government meetings, and by giving state 
authority to a student’s choice to opt out of school assignments on 
religious grounds, the government impermissibly entangles itself in 
the practice of religion and the promotion of religion over non-
religion.  
A third way to challenge the amendment would be to bring a 
claim under the Free Exercise Clause in federal court.
173
 On its face, 
the amendment appears to promote both religious exercise and non-
religious exercise, equally. But the Court in City of Hialeah rejected 
the idea that Free Exercise inquiry ends with the text of a state law.
174
 
The state legislature’s purpose in drafting the amendment was to 
promote religion—and Christianity, specifically.175 In addition, by 
allowing for sectarian prayer at government meetings, and by 
permitting students to incorporate religious beliefs into school 
assignments and presentations, the amendment infringes on the free 
 
 170. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (“[I]ts principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion.”). 
 171. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither [state nor federal 
governments] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.”). The amendment’s provision allowing students to incorporate their religious beliefs 
into school assignments and presentations fails this second prong of the Lemon test for the same 
reason that the opt-out provision fails. It is a promotion of religion by the state government, and 
it acts to hinder the right to non-religion. The same reasoning applies to the provision 
potentially allowing for sectarian prayer in government meetings. 
 172. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted) (“[T]he statute must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”). 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 174. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 175. Amendment Passes, supra note 70. 
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exercise of religion for people who do not believe in the prayers or 
information being offered. This is the case for people who belong to a 
different religion than the one expressed and for those who do not 
subscribe to any religion. Therefore, if the court looks at the purpose 
of the Right to Pray amendment—according to its sponsors, to 
promote Christianity—and the effect the amendment will most likely 
have—infringing on the rights of non-Christians—it will likely find 
the amendment violates the Free Exercise Clause as well as the 
Establishment Clause.  
In addition to the amendment’s unconstitutionality, it should be 
struck down for policy reasons, since it contains few new freedoms 
and does more harm than good. If the court decided to remove the 
provisions that enable students to participate,
176
 the amendment 
would be left as a reiteration of rights that have always existed under 
the United States Constitution. It would be useless in such a situation. 
Therefore, the best solution would be to invalidate the amendment as 
a whole and maintain the Missouri Constitution as it was prior to the 
Right to Pray amendment.
177
   
 
 176. Those are the provisions most likely to be struck down in federal court as 
unconstitutional, if the court chooses to only strike down part of the amendment. 
 177. In light of recent legislation in some states, such as Tennessee, that increasingly 
allows for creationism or intelligent design to be taught in public schools, it is likely other states 
will follow Missouri’s lead and introduce similar “right to pray” amendments. Adam Cohen, A 
Back-to-School Fight Over the Right to Classroom Prayer, TIME, Aug. 28, 2012, available at 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/08/28/a-back-to-school-fight-over-the-right-to-classroom-prayer/. 
See also Steigman & Ellison, supra note 69. Kevin Eckstrom, Editor-in-Chief of Religion News 
Service, says many states have been discussing the underlying questions and fears that led to the 
Missouri amendment. Id. Indeed, other states have seen recent attempts to amend their state 
constitutions with “religious freedom” amendments. North Dakota voters in 2012 rejected a 
religious freedom amendment to their state constitution that would have created new 
“exemptions for religious activity in secular life.” John Nichols, A Red State Rebuke to 
Religious Fear-Mongering, NATION (June 13, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.thenation.com/ 
blog/168371red-state-rebuke-religious-fear-mongering#. Florida voters similarly refused to pass 
Amendment 8, which would have opened the door to allow state funds to support religious 
institutions. Toluse Olorunnipa & Brittany Alana Davis, Florida Voters Reject Most 
Constitutional Amendments, Including ‘Religious Freedom’ Proposal, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2012, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/elections/article1260351. 
ece. If other states do follow in Missouri’s footsteps, the country will probably see increased 
litigation, perhaps in the United States Supreme Court, about religious liberty in the near future.  
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CONCLUSION 
Missouri’s Right to Pray amendment presents more problems than 
remedies. Although it was widely supported by Missouri voters, the 
ballot summary left out important details: the amendment allows 
students to opt out of educational assignments and gives students 
permission to express religious beliefs in school activities.  
The language that was left off the ballot has the potential to 
restrict the religious freedom of religious minorities by allowing for 
more religious expression in schools and government meetings— 
particularly, expressions by the Christian majority. The amendment 
also enables students to opt out of subjects in school they contend are 
contrary to their religious beliefs. Such activity is antithetical to 
policies that favor exposing students to diverse topics, as expressed 
by the Sixth Circuit in Mozert.
178
 
Ultimately, the amendment’s vague and ambiguous language is 
likely to spark a great deal of litigation that will highlight the 
confusion inherent in the amendment text, costing taxpayers money 
and impeding the operations of school boards. It appears to be an 
issue for the federal courts, which will likely invalidate the 
amendment as unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 178. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1058. 
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